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Abstract:	Based on game theory and dynamic Level-𝑘 model, this paper establishes an intelligent traffic control method for intersections, studies the influence of multi-agent vehicle joint decision-making and group behavior disturbance on system state. The dynamic Level-𝑘 model is used in emergency vehicles to analyze decision-making behavior and system performance. The simulation results show that this method has a good performance when there are more vehicles or emergency vehicles have higher priority.  
I. Introduction Intelligent traffic system (ITS) uses communication network and artificial intelligence technology to collect different levels of traffic information and decision-making behavior, establish dynamic model of traffic system, and carry out short-term and long-term management and control according to the information and model, so as to improve transportation efficiency, alleviate traffic congestion, reduce traffic accidents, realize the harmony of people, vehicles and roads, and provide better service for traffic participants.  At the intersection controlled by traffic lights, the decision-making of vehicles only depends on the signal timing in most cases, that is to say, when there is no accident, vehicles follow the traffic rule of “red for stop and green for go”. When the signal timing is set reasonably, the intersection can usually achieve the optimal situation.  In the intersection without traffic signal control, each vehicle can make any decision to maximize the individual utility, which forms a game. But the result of the game is not always satisfactory. Sometimes it may fall into a low-level equilibrium, which is reflected in traffic congestion or accidents at intersections. Therefore, how to make rules to make the game as close as possible to the optimal solution of the system is a problem to be solved.  The game of intersection is infinite, but the payoff function is only related to the results of the following several times, and the discount factor is small. This kind of foresight can be analyzed by dynamic Level-𝑘 model. Different from straight road traffic control, the state space of intersection is more diversified, and when the number of vehicles is large, it is easy to cause traffic congestion, making intersection control more complex.  In this paper, we will focus on the system performance of intersections, study the rule design method to avoid or ease traffic congestion, especially the impact of emergency vehicles on the system and the intelligent traffic control of intersections with emergency vehicles. The next few parts of this paper will discuss the following problems: the research status of intelligent traffic control methods at intersections, the principles of 
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game theory and dynamic Level-𝑘 model and their application, simulation data analysis of intersection and incentive mechanism and guidance strategy of traffic control.   
II. Literature review In recent years, intelligent transportation and automatic driving have been increasingly concerned by industry and academia. Intelligent traffic control technology, i.e. information processing and analysis system, has various algorithms, such as ant colony algorithm, Dijkstra algorithm and A* algorithm for shortest path optimization based on trajectory planning; and Yolo algorithm based on road recognition and target detection to calculate the speed and density of vehicles, judge the length of time for drivers to reach the destination, and avoid congestion. [6][7] For the intelligent traffic control of intersections, many researches focus on the design of traffic signal timing, and then guide the decision-making of vehicles. At present, reinforcement learning, which is very popular, is widely used in signal timing. The state space of signal timing is less, and only four signal phases can be set at the simplest intersection. Guo used the method of combining deep reinforcement learning with traffic signal control to transform the traffic signal control problem into a reinforcement learning problem interacting with the intersection on a discrete time step, taking the waiting time of the intersection as the objective function. The results show that the waiting time of vehicles under different saturation flow rates has different degrees of improvement, which verifies the effectiveness of the algorithm. [8] Chen applied deep reinforcement learning to intelligent control of traffic signals, which can obtain good traffic signal control strategies and effectively reduce vehicle stay time, vehicle delay and traffic congestion. Among them, the average driving time of vehicles was reduced by 34.1%, the average queue length was shortened by 19.4%, and the average waiting time was reduced by 24.0%. [9] Zhu proposed an adaptive and coordinated intelligent traffic signal control system, which can detect the traffic condition of the road in real time, and regulate the traffic light duration according to the traffic flow of each road section, and establish the system control between the signal lights, so as to ensure the shortest waiting time of vehicles for the red light, and realize the maximum dredging effect of the road. [10] The complexity of the game theory model is related to the dimension of the state space (the number of branches of the extended subgame) and the dimension of the strategy space. Compared with intersections, straight roads are studied earlier using game theory models. The vehicle status on a straight road can be described by a two-dimensional matrix. The strategy space only involves two possibilities of longitudinal acceleration (forward direction) and deflection acceleration (lane change), so it is easier to study. Li studied online traffic control based on game theory and proposed a method to simulate driver interaction behavior under given traffic conditions. [5] In addition, combined with the support vector machine model with high comprehensive prediction performance, the recognition accuracy of lane changing behavior can reach 92.97% , surpassing other models and much higher than the regular model. Evolutionary game theory has also been applied to lane change decision model. [11] In the game theory control of intersections, Li proposed a game theory method of multi-stage and interactive decision-making model of vehicles at unsignalized 
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intersections. This paper mainly studies the situation of traffic accidents when two vehicles are driving in opposite directions without intervention. The dynamic Level-𝑘 model is used to model the time-varying multi-step vehicle interaction at unsignalized intersections. The results show that compared with different types of drivers, the traffic control system has the ability to solve the intersection conflict. [4] In this paper, we will modify and improve the above model to study the situation of multi-agent vehicle joint decision-making. On this basis, we will model its characteristics and possible behaviors, describe its decision-making process and the interaction between various actors, study the influence of group behavior on individual behavior, and analyze the disturbance on the system state. According to the above research results, effective system governance rules and incentive mechanism are formulated to guide user behavior and make the system achieve the desired state. At the same time, the dynamic Level-𝑘 model is applied to analyze the decision-making behavior and system performance of emergency vehicles.   
III. Model Construction  
1. Intersection Game Model The following will introduce the principle of the intersection game model in accordance with the sequence of the establishment process. 
(1) From the decision-making behavior of individual vehicles, the traffic 
problem at the intersection forms a game.	 All vehicles constitute the players of the game 𝐼 = {1, 2,… ,𝑛}. The strategy space 𝑆𝑖 includes acceleration, deceleration, turning a corner, lane changing, etc. The payoff function 𝐻𝑖(𝒔) is composed of factors such as transit time and safety.  
(2) As	the vehicle makes decisions all the time, it is an	infinite	complete 
information	game.  The intersection mentioned in this paper is a square area centered on the intersection node, including the length of road intersection and entrance. The model assumes that the decision-making process of each vehicle 𝑖 is always carried out from the beginning of vehicle entering the intersection to the end of leaving the intersection, which is a continuous time decision-making process, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = [Δ𝑣𝑖(𝑡),Δ𝜃𝑖(𝑡)]. For the convenience of research, the discretization is made, that is, each unit time interval makes a decision, 𝑠𝑖[𝑛] = [Δ𝑣𝑖[𝑛],Δ𝜃𝑖[𝑛]], and at the same time, the vehicle changes its motion state according to the decision made. The kinematics equation is 𝑥[𝑛+ 1] = 𝑥[𝑛] + (𝑣[𝑛] +Δ𝑣𝑖[𝑛]2 ) cos 𝜃[𝑛] 𝑦[𝑛+ 1] = 𝑦[𝑛] + (𝑣[𝑛] +Δ𝑣𝑖[𝑛]2 ) sin 𝜃[𝑛] 𝑣[𝑛+ 1] = 𝑣[𝑛] +Δ𝑣𝑖[𝑛] 𝜃[𝑛+ 1] = 𝜃[𝑛] +Δ𝜃𝑖[𝑛] Make the next decision until the next time interval is reached. When the unit time interval is sufficiently small, discrete decision-making tends to be 
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continuous decision-making. Discretization of decision-making changes the infinite game into a finite game.  
(3) Vehicles have different	queuing	priorities, making decisions in a certain 
order, which changes the simultaneous game into a sequential game.	 Theoretically, vehicles with the same level make decisions at the same time. When the number of vehicles is large, it greatly increases the dimension of the game matrix. Since each vehicle enters the intersection at a different time, according to the first-come-first-served (FCFS) principle in queuing theory, vehicles with the same level are divided as “queuing priority”.  Suppose two levels 𝐿𝑘 and 𝐿𝑘+1vehicles 𝑉𝑘1,𝑉𝑘2 and 𝑉𝑘+11 ,𝑉𝑘+12 , and they are sorted according to the order of entering the intersection, then the queuing priority of the vehicles with the two priorities is 𝑉𝑘1,𝑉𝑘2,𝑉𝑘+11 ,𝑉𝑘+12 . In this way, the sequential expansion of simultaneous game is realized. The calculation is simplified, and the fairness principle is also taken into account.  
(4) Because the state of the vehicle is different from that of the last decision, it 
is a sequential game with different structure.  In the transportation system, the subgame of each stage is different from that of the previous stage, for example, the payoff function. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate the total payoff function with the proportional series of one-time game payoff function. The discount problem cannot be ignored in infinite game, and the discount rate must be considered, which is usually recorded as 𝜸. The analysis of players and game equilibrium must be based on present value. In this kind of game, trying to cooperate and punishing non-cooperation are the key to realize the ideal equilibrium and the core of constructing high level equilibrium.  
(5) Because vehicles only focus on the utility of several times, the farther the 
utility is, the less influence it has on current decision-making.  The degree of foresight here is an assumption of the sequential game discount rate. For the dynamic Level-0 model, the foresight degree is 0, and the corresponding discount rate is 𝜸 = (1, 0,… , 0,… )⊤; for the dynamic Level-𝑘 model, the foresight degree is 𝑘, and the corresponding discount rate is 𝜸 =(0,… , 0, 1, 0,… )⊤, 𝛾𝑘 = 1, 𝛾𝑗 = 0, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. The discount rate 𝜸 is an infinite dimensional vector. This shows that vehicles with foresight of 0 only focus on the immediate utility, which is equivalent to greedy algorithm. In many cases of traffic system, greedy algorithm can only get local optimal solution. In Level-𝑘 model, vehicles with level 𝑘 only focus on the utility after 𝑘 stage. Compared with greedy algorithm, this prediction can make the game reach a higher level of equilibrium. In particular, given 𝑘 → ∞, vehicles pay attention to the utility at infinity, that is, the perfect Nash equilibrium of subgame obtained by reverse induction. As mentioned above, under the premise of limited induction and time unraveling, players often violate the reverse induction. In some cases, the Nash equilibrium is not equivalent to the optimal solution of the system. Therefore, whether the 𝑘 value is reasonable or not directly affects the system performance. This paper will focus on 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2,… . [1][2][3] 
(6) The dynamic Level-𝒌 model is used for emergency vehicles.  
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The practical significance of dynamic Level-𝑘 model is directly reflected in the control of emergency vehicles. Emergency vehicles include police vehicles, ambulances and fire engines. Their special status and social value require higher priority of service than ordinary vehicles. In the queuing theory, there are three queuing rules – first-come-first-serve, last-come-first-serve (LCFS) and priority service (PS). If the above queuing rules are regarded as first-come-first-serve, the queuing rules for emergency vehicles are priority service. In this paper, the 𝑘 value of emergency vehicle is lower than that of other vehicles.    
2. Hypothesis of Intersection Game Model 
(1) Strategy	space Under the premise of discretized game, when considering the decision of each vehicle, there are six strategies in strategy space: keep the motion state unchanged (no-op), accelerate, decelerate, brake, turn left, turn right. Vectors 𝑠 = (Δ𝑣,Δ𝜃) are used to represent changes in the speed and direction of the driving strategy:  𝑠1 = (0, 0), 𝑠2 = (𝑎, 0), 𝑠3 = (−𝑎, 0), 𝑠4 = (−𝑣, 0), 𝑠5 = (0,𝜔), 𝑠6 = (0,−𝜔) Where 𝑎 is the acceleration of the vehicle at acceleration or deceleration, 𝑣 is the speed of the vehicle, and 𝜔 is the angular speed when the vehicle turns. This paper mainly studies the variable speed model, which assumes that the vehicle will not deviate from the scheduled route. If there is a car in front of it, adjust the speed in the scheduled route. Corresponding to this is the lane-changing model, which is more widely studied in the straight-way traffic control system. The variable-speed model simplifies the above policy space with 4 kinds of decisions – 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4.  
(2) Payoff function It is assumed that the payoff function of each player is in the following form:  𝐻𝑖(𝒔) = (𝑤1𝑑𝑖 + 𝑤2𝑛𝑖 + 𝑤3𝑠𝑖 + 𝑤4𝑣𝑖)|𝒔 Where 𝑑 is the Euclidean distance between the ego vehicle location and the destination, 𝑛 is the total number of other vehicles in a certain range outside the ego vehicle, 𝑠 is the straight distance between the ego vehicle and the intersection center, 𝑣 is the speed of the ego vehicle. 𝑛 and 𝑠 represent safety preference factors, assuming that the less the total number of other vehicles in a range outside the vehicle, the farther the straight line from the center of the intersection, the safer the vehicle; 𝑑 and 𝑣 represent efficiency preference factors, the closer the vehicle location is to the straight line of the destination, the faster the vehicle is, and the more efficient the vehicle is. 𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4 is a weight factor whose specific value is related to the way preference factors are measured.  
(3) Level According to the dynamic Level-𝑘 model, it is assumed that each vehicle follows a fixed level when making decisions, that is, only select the optimal strategy based on a limited number of situations in the future. If the level of all vehicles is 0, the current optimal strategy is directly selected, that 
 6 
is, max𝑠𝑖 𝐻𝑖(𝒔). If the level of all vehicles is 1, considering the next possible situation, all vehicles in the environment make joint decisions for all possible outcomes and select the optimal strategy, that is, max𝑠𝑖,𝑠?̃? 𝐻𝑖(𝒔)̃, where 𝑠?̃? is the decision made when the current situation adopts the strategy 𝑠𝑖 to reach the next state, 𝒔 ̃ is the situation of the next state. Following the rules of different levels, the vehicles with low level take the lead in making the decision, and the decisions of the remaining vehicles are made under the premise that those vehicle makes the best decision.  Suppose that the levels of 𝑛 vehicles is 𝑘1 < 𝑘2 < ⋯ < 𝑘𝑛. According to the inverse induction method, the optimization function of the 𝑛th car is  max𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑛(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−1∗ , 𝑠𝑛) Note 𝜎𝑛 = arg max𝐻𝑛(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−1∗ , 𝑠𝑛) = 𝜎𝑛(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−1∗ ). Substitute into the optimization function of the (𝑛 − 1)th vehicle,  max𝑠𝑛−1,𝑠𝑛 𝐻𝑛−1(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−2∗ , 𝑠𝑛−1, 𝑠𝑛) = max𝑠𝑛−1 𝐻𝑛−1(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−2∗ , 𝑠𝑛−1,𝜎𝑛) Note 𝜎𝑛−1 = arg max𝐻𝑛−1(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−2∗ , 𝑠𝑛−1,𝜎𝑛) = 𝜎𝑛−1(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−2∗ )... By analogy, the optimization function of the first vehicle is  max𝑠1 𝐻1(𝑠1,𝜎2,… ,𝜎𝑛) The optimal decision is  𝑠1∗ = arg max𝐻1(𝑠1,𝜎2,… ,𝜎𝑛) = arg max𝐻1[𝑠1,𝜎2(𝑠1∗),… ,𝜎𝑛(𝑠1∗ ,… )] Substituting  𝜎2 = arg max𝐻2[𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2,… ,𝜎𝑛(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗ ,𝜎3(𝑠1∗ , 𝑠2∗),… )] We can find 𝑠2∗ , and 𝑠3∗ , 𝑠4∗ ,… , 𝑠𝑛−1∗ , 𝑠𝑛∗  likewise.  For emergency vehicles, in data analysis, the Level-0 model is adopted for a single high-level emergency vehicle, that is, only focusing on the maximum of its own utility. At this time, all vehicles in the system are a mixture of different levels of vehicles. Multiple medium emergency vehicles have the same level as ordinary vehicles, but have higher queuing priority.  
(4) Optimization	goal The evaluation of traffic system performance is usually reflected in two aspects: throughput and social welfare. In the data analysis, the respective certain number of vehicles through the intersection of the traffic congestion and the total time (the number of cross-sectional data of all vehicles in an intersection) on behalf of the two evaluation indexes.    
IV.	Data Analysis 
1. Experimental Platform The open source traffic simulation platform SUMO (simulation of urban mobility) developed by German Aerospace Center is selected as the experimental platform. It has micro continuous road traffic simulation architecture, which can simulate traffic behavior, 
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road network construction and traffic data collection. The traffic control interface (TraCI) of SUMO can dynamically control vehicle decision-making.  We will analyze the intersection performance and vehicle decision-making behavior from the system level and individual level, and finally study the impact of emergency vehicles on the system.   
2. Intersection Performance – System	Level 
(1) Influence of Random Rate 
 The above figure shows the frequency distribution histogram of the influence of the probability of abnormal occurrence (random rate) on the system in the Level-0 model, Level-1 model and car flow model (CF) when other conditions are appropriate and unchanged. The abscissa represents the total number of vehicles in the intersection at the current time, the ordinate represents the frequency of the event, and the interval width of the frequency distribution histogram is 1.  CF was used as the control group (baseline), and the Level-0 and Level-1 game models were used as the experimental group. The probability of abnormal occurrence in CF is different from Level-0 and Level-1, so random rate has no effect on CF.  Since the initial phase and the end stage are unidirectional, with only input or output, similar to padding; other stages are bidirectional, with both input and output. However, the total number of vehicles in one-way phase is generally low, so the negative skewness coefficient of frequency distribution histogram is larger when vehicles are input continuously. In order to simplify the analysis, we ignore the interval of 0 ∼ 5 vehicle number, and approximately assume that the other intervals represent the actual frequency distribution.  It can be seen from the figure that the overall frequency distribution presents an inverted bell shape, but there is data fluctuation. This is because the driving direction of the input vehicle has a significant impact on the time, which will be further analyzed 
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later. If all vehicles have the same driving direction, the inverted bell shape of frequency distribution is more obvious.   
Total Time Random	Rate	= 0 Random	Rate	= 0.5 Random	Rate	= 1 Level-0 520 568 587 Level-1 411 423 587 CF 451 451 451  Horizontal comparison of the impact of random factors on the system: with the increase of the probability of abnormal occurrence, the frequency distribution histogram skews to the right. This is because the increase of unstable factors will cause vehicle congestion and the decrease of overall driving speed, which together lead to the increase of total time and the general increase of the number of vehicles in the intersection.  Longitudinal comparison of the properties of different models under fixed random factors: it can be seen that the number of vehicles at intersections in Level-1 is generally low, and the distribution is relatively concentrated; the number of vehicles at intersections in Level-1 is generally high, and the distribution is relatively scattered; the distribution of vehicle number in the intersection of CF is between Level-0 and Level-1. This shows that the effect of Level-1 is better than that of control group, and the effect of Level-0 is opposite.  When the probability of abnormal occurrence is 0.5, the effect of Level-1 is close to CF, which shows that Level-1 has better anti-interference ability. When the probability of abnormal occurrence is 1, Level-0 and Level-1 become completely random models, and they have the same performance.   
(2) Influence of Number of Cars 
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The above figure shows the frequency distribution histogram of the number of cars input on the system when other conditions are appropriate and unchanged.   
Total Time Number = 200 Number = 500 Number = 1000 Level-0 520 1182 2327 Level-1 411 1009 2011 CF 451 1083 2087  Horizontal comparison of the impact of the number of input vehicles on the system: with the increase of the number of input vehicles, the frequency distribution histogram skews to the right. This is because the increase of the number of input vehicles will cause the congestion of vehicles and the decrease of the overall driving speed, which together lead to the increase of the total time and the number of vehicles in the intersection generally increases.  Longitudinal comparison of the properties of different models under the fixed number of vehicles also shows that the effect of Level-1 is better than that of the control group, while the effect of Level-0 is opposite. Throughput measures the amount of service a system provides per unit of time. Therefore, it is necessary to normalize the influence of the number of vehicles on the system, that is, the total time per unit number of vehicles (100) passing through the intersection. After normalization, it can be found that when the number of vehicles is less than 1000, the impact of vehicle number on throughput is opposite to that on total time. This is because in a certain range, the more vehicles, the more the system to be served. When the number of vehicles does not reach the maximum potential of the system service capacity, the throughput rate is positively correlated with the number of vehicles to be served. When the number of vehicles continues to increase, the normalized total time will also gradually increase.   
(3) Influence of Time Interval 
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 The above figure shows the histogram of frequency distribution of the influence of vehicle time interval on the system when other conditions are appropriate and unchanged.   
Total Time Time Interval = 1 Time Interval = 2 Time Interval = 3 Level-0 1846 1182 1032 Level-1 1250 1009 1010 CF 1535 1083 1014  Horizontal comparison of the impact of vehicle time interval on the system: with the increase of vehicle time interval, the frequency distribution histogram skews to the left, which is because the increase of vehicle time interval will reduce vehicle congestion and improve the overall driving speed, which together lead to the reduction of total time and the general reduction of the number of vehicles in the intersection. On the contrary, the effect of Level-0 is better than that of the control model. The performance of higher Level-𝑘 is close to that of Level-1. In fact, the number of times to make decisions within the intersection is very limited. The value of 𝑘 has an upper bound and changes with the state. Considering the computational complexity of game theory, 𝑘 value should not be too large.   
3. Vehicle Decision-making Behavior – Individual Level 
(1) Influence of	Driving Direction	on Decision-making Behavior The driving direction – left turn, straight ahead and right turn – is considered as an endogenous variable because the vehicle may pass through multiple intersections when it reaches its destination. Assuming that every intersection is homogeneous, how to choose the driving direction of these intersections determines the total time, and then affects individual decision-making behavior. Each driver will choose the direction with the 
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shortest driving time as much as possible, so it is necessary to study the passing time of various driving directions in an intersection. Because the time of a single individual is not universal and the error is large, the total time of vehicles with different driving directions passing through the intersection in a period of time is still taken as the dependent variable. Besides, the test is repeated many times, and the driving direction of the input vehicle is changed immediately each time.  
 The above figure shows the frequency distribution histogram and frequency density curve of the total time passing through the intersection in different driving directions when other conditions remain unchanged and appropriate. It can be found that the frequency density of the three driving directions follows an normal distribution: the average time of right turn is the shortest and the distribution is the most concentrated; the average time of left turn is the longest and the distribution is the most scattered. This is consistent with practical experience. Right turning vehicles usually pass through the intersection without being obstructed by other vehicles; in addition, in the same intersection, the distance of right turning vehicles is smaller than that of left turning and straight driving.  From the above analysis, it can be seen that each individual wants to choose as many right turns or straight lines as possible and less left turns. In the real time setting of traffic lights, this incentive mode is also used, which allows the time of left turn to be shorter than that of straight and right turn, so that the driver can choose to go straight or turn right as much as possible.   
(2) Influence of	Speed or Safety Preference on Decision-making Behavior Speed or safety preference weight directly determines the utility. Intuitively, the larger the speed preference weight is, the smaller the safety preference weight is, and the individual will prefer to accelerate decision-making and hate deceleration decision-making. But this is not the case.   
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 The above figure shows the influence of speed preference weight on average driving time of three driving directions, and the image of safety preference weight is almost the same. It can be found that there is no positive or negative correlation between the average driving time and the two weights, because the maximum driving speed of the vehicle is taken as exogenous variable in the previous study. Even if each individual prefers a higher speed (which also contains higher risk), it is impossible to make a decision to exceed the speed limit due to the setting of the speed limit. At the same time, as long as the utility function has a positive preference for speed, the individual must accelerate as much as possible in the limited time. Therefore, the way to change the preference weight will not stimulate the individual behavior and improve the system performance. Of course, these weights are related to the measurement methods of speed and safe distance. If they are changed to other measurement methods, such as the total time at the intersection (i.e. the ratio of distance to current speed), the weights will change significantly. However, the conclusion is that changing the preference weight will not improve the performance of the system. This implies that the decision-making behavior may be affected by setting exogenous variables such as maximum speed and safe distance.  It can also be found that the average driving time fluctuation of left turn is the largest, and that of right turn is the smallest. The average driving time of the three driving directions was positively correlated, and had nothing to do with the preference weight. This is because when congestion occurs, the average driving time in any direction of driving usually increases.   
(3) Influence of Maximum Speed and Minimum Safety Distance on Decision-making 
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 The two figures above show the effects of maximum speed and minimum safe distance on the average driving time of vehicles passing through intersections. Within a certain range (for example, when the maximum speed is less than 10m/s and the minimum safety distance is greater than 2 ∼ 3m), the greater the maximum speed, the smaller the minimum safety distance and the shorter the average driving time.  In the graph of the influence of maximum speed on average driving time, it can be found that when the maximum speed is set very small, the curve fluctuates greatly. This is because the more strict the speed limit, the more likely congestion will occur. When some congestion reaches a certain degree, the simulation platform will automatically remove the vehicles with the longest and most serious congestion time. The geometric shape and other characteristics of congestion formed by different maximum speeds are 
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different, so the impact of removing vehicles on the system fluctuates greatly. Of course, the maximum speed should be set beyond the range of these fluctuations.  This is in line with the actual traffic rules. Usually, the maximum speed and minimum safety distance will be set on the roads with large traffic flow, dense vehicles or special functions. On the one hand, the purpose is to limit the speed limit and vehicle distance, and on the other hand, it is also an incentive for drivers: seeing the value on the sign, most drivers will try their best to get close to the maximum speed and minimum safety distance.   
4. Influence of Emergency Vehicles with High Priority on the System Vehicle priority refers to the decision-making order of vehicles in the intersection sequential game. In fact, the priority of vehicles is assigned according to the order of arriving at the intersection. The priority of vehicles arriving first is higher than that of vehicles arriving later. According to the knowledge of game theory, leaders of decision variables in dynamic game have advantages, such as Stackelberg model and price leadership model in strategic behavior. The best choice of followers should be the decision which can maximize their utility when the leader’s decision variables are given. In this sense, leaders have the advantage of taking the first step, while followers can only follow suit.  This part of the study is divided into two aspects: the impact of a single high emergency vehicle on the system, and the impact of multiple medium emergency vehicles on the system. As mentioned above, for emergency vehicles, in the data analysis, the Level-0 model is adopted for single high-level emergency vehicles, that is, only focus on their own utility maximization. At this time, all vehicles in the system are a mixture of different levels of vehicles (Level-0 vs Level-1); multiple medium emergency vehicles have the same level as ordinary vehicles, but have higher queuing priority.  According to the simulation results, when the emergency vehicles arrive, ordinary vehicles usually choose as many deceleration decisions as possible, while emergency vehicles choose as many acceleration decisions as possible. Because it takes a long time for the vehicle to pass through the intersection, the length of the time is much longer than the time for the vehicle to decelerate to 0. Therefore, when emergency vehicles join, almost all non-emergency vehicles will eventually decelerate to 0 and will not start to accelerate until the emergency vehicles leave the intersection.  
 
No priority       Single high emergency  No priority Multiple medium emergency 
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The above two figures show the impact of “single high emergency vehicles” and “multiple medium emergency vehicles” on the system, namely, the histogram of frequency distribution of vehicle number at each moment, and the broken line chart of vehicle number changing with time.  A single high emergency vehicle enters the intersection at the 100th moment. From the frequency distribution histogram, it can be seen that high priority vehicles will aggravate the system congestion, that is, the instantaneous maximum number of vehicles will become larger. It can be seen from the broken line chart that the entry of advanced emergency vehicles will immediately change the number of vehicles in the intersection, and will have an impact for a period of time.  Several medium emergency vehicles entered the intersection at 0, 40, 80, 120, 160. The same conclusion can also be drawn from the statistical chart: high priority vehicles will aggravate the system congestion, and will immediately change the number of vehicles in the intersection, causing an impact in a period of time.  By comparing the impact of “single high emergency vehicle” and “multiple medium emergency vehicle”, it can be found that the entry of single high emergency vehicle occurs at the moment when the number of vehicles at the intersection is the most, and the impact on the system lasts the longest. Several times of medium emergency vehicles entering, some appeared at the time when there were fewer vehicles, some appeared at the time when there were more vehicles. When the number of vehicles is small, emergency vehicles have little impact on the system. The more vehicles are, the more significant the lag effect is. At the same time, from the frequency distribution histogram, it can be found that “single high emergency vehicle” has more significant negative impact on the system than “multiple medium emergency vehicle”.  In order to make emergency vehicles have higher priority, the interests of other vehicles are sacrificed. In the theory of game theory, when all vehicles can participate in the game equally, the system reaches Pareto optimality. When the priority of some individuals is artificially increased for some purposes, it is similar to adding a limited wedge to the optimal condition. The priority passing of emergency vehicles has higher social value, which is in line with the concept of utilitarianism.    
V. Conclusion Based on the game theory and dynamic Level-𝑘 model, this paper establishes the intelligent traffic control method of intersection, studies the situation of multi-agent vehicle joint decision-making, and the influence of group behavior on individual behavior and system state, and analyzes the influence of disturbance on system state. The dynamic Level-𝑘 model is also applied to analyze the decision-making behavior and system performance of emergency vehicles.  The simulation results show that under the fixed model, the increase of the probability of occurrence of random factors, the increase of the number of input vehicles, and the decrease of vehicle time interval will cause vehicle congestion and overall driving speed reduction. Under the fixed random factors, vehicle number and vehicle time interval, the Level-1 game model is better than the Level-0 model. The performance of the higher Level-𝑘 model is close to that of the level-1 model. For emergency vehicles, 
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when the number of vehicles is small, the emergency vehicles will hardly affect the system. The more the number of vehicles, the more significant the lag effect. The negative impact of single high emergency vehicles on the system is more significant than that of multiple medium emergency vehicles. In order to make emergency vehicles with higher social value have higher priority, the interests of other vehicles are sacrificed.  According to the above results, within a certain range, the greater the maximum speed and the smaller the minimum safety distance, the shorter the average driving time. However, the way to change the preference weight will not stimulate the individual behavior and improve the system performance. In the unsignalized intersection, the maximum speed and the minimum safety distance can be set to formulate effective system governance rules and incentive mechanism to guide drivers’ behavior.  
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